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ABSTRACT
This article reviews and discusses the various ways by which researchers in the cognitive 
science of religion have empirically demonstrated that neurotypical humans (a.k.a., the folk) 
represent supernatural agents through the cognitive analogical processes of anthropomor-
phism. These include attributing a human-like mind, human-like physical and mental lim-
itations, and human-like sociability. Additionally, the article points to several problematic 
issues that CSR must needs address, such as how to better demarcate when the folk are 
anthropomorphizing versus simply attributing agency, and how CSR’s insistence that the 
folk represents supernatural agents as disembodied minds places it at odds with the over-
whelming and devastating evidence to the contrary.
Keywords: anthropomorphism, supernatural agent representations, theory of mind, em-
bodiment.
RESUMO
Este artigo revê e discute as várias maneiras pelas quais os pesquisadores da ciência cog-
nitiva da religião (CCR) demonstraram empiricamente que os seres humanos neurotípicos 
(também conhecidos como folk) representam agentes sobrenaturais através dos processos 
analógicos cognitivos do antropomorfismo. Estes incluem a atribuição de uma mente hu-
mana, limitações físicas e mentais hmanas e sociabilidade humana. Além disso, o artigo 
aponta para várias questões problemáticas que a CCR deve abordar, por exemplo, como 
demarcar quando as pessoas estão antropomorfizando versus simplesmente atribuindo 
agenciamento, e como a insistência da CCR de que o folk  representa agentes sobrenatu-
rais como mentes desencarnadas o coloca em desacordo com a esmagadora e devastadora 
evidência do contrário.
Palavras-chave: antropomorfismo, representações de agentes sobrenaturais, teoria da 
mente, incorporação.
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Sorting through, and sorting 
out, anthropomorphism in CSR
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Anthropomorphism and supernatural agents
We live in a world that is increasingly anthropomorphic. As our technological prowess in-
creases, we find ourselves more and more intera ing with inanimate objects as if they were hu-
man. Our cars talk to us, see for us, and even make operating decisions for us. Our various compu-
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tational devices anticipate our psychological needs and supply 
us with an endless stream of socially relevant information and 
content fulfilling those needs. Our televisions “get to know us” 
and recommend programs which match our interests. Our 
refrigerators can do our grocery shopping for us. 
Seeing the world anthropomorphically, however, is 
nothing new to humans (Boyer, 1996; Epley et al., 2007; 
Guthrie, 1980, 1993, 2007; Mithen and Boyer, 1996; Sev-
erson and Lemm, 2016; Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal, 
2015; Waytz et al., 2014; Waytz et al., 2010a; Waytz et al., 
2010b). Anthropomorphizing the world—its events, ob-
jects, and creatures—makes it a less scary, more familiar 
place. For instance, consider the teddy bear. We have tak-
en one of the world’s apex predators and turned it into a 
child’s toy. In doing so, we stripped away its vicious features 
designed by evolution to violently kill and replaced those 
with human infant-like characteristics. The teddy bear is 
intentionally crafted to have those human infant-like facial 
characteristics. It has a round, flattened face, accompanied 
by a snub nose, a narrow mouth with no visible teeth, a 
large forehead, and large eyes with large sclera. This an-
thropomorphism serves a specific purpose: to make the 
toy endearing to humans (Hinde and Barden, 1985). 
Anthropomorphism allows us mentally to tame the wild-
est and scariest creatures.
Anthropomorphism is the analogical cognitive modeling 
process by which we take that which is most intimately famil-
iar to us, ourselves, and project those chara eristics onto unfa-
miliar events, objects, and beings in the world. We undertake 
this modeling process for a variety of reasons: to understand 
better and to predict our environment; to feel a modicum of 
control over events and things which are (in reality) out of 
our control; to engage in social relationships with nonhuman 
things and beings; among others. In these roles, anthropomor-
phism looms large in religion, particularly in the representa-
tion of supernatural agents (Epley et al., 2007; Guthrie, 1980, 
1993; Hodge, 2006; Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal, 2015). 
Supernatural agents are themselves a broad category dis-
playing a wide diversity across time, cultures, and religions. 
There are supernatural agentive personifications of inani-
mate objects and forces: such as is prevalent in the Japanese 
Kami and Greek mythology; supernatural beasts such as Cer-
berus, Pegasus and Ammit; mixtures of gods, humans and 
beasts such as the Minotaur, Anubis, Garunda, and Ganesh; 
divine and human mixtures, such as Heracles, the Jade Em-
peror, Dionysus, Buddha, and Jesus; and wholly divine beings 
such as Ra, Zeus, Vishnu, and the Christian God, Yahweh. 
An additional group of supernatural agents is the afterliving 
deceased—humans who have survived their own death and 
reside in an afterlife. 
As one would expect, how neurotypical humans (here-
after: the folk) represent supernatural agents is a central issue 
in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and understanding 
those representations centers around anthropomorphism. 
Yet, anthropomorphism is a confusing and often confused 
topic in the CSR. There are two overarching theories: ei-
ther supernatural agents are produced by cognitive processes 
which lead to anthropomorphic supernatural representa-
tions, or they do not. Much of this debate revolves around 
two additionally divergent views: either folk supernatural 
agent concepts are anthropomorphic because they attribute 
human-like limitations to the divine, or supernatural agents 
are not anthropomorphic because they do not share our lim-
itations. Moreover, there are additional squabbles over how 
these chara eristics the folk put upon their gods are agent-, 
human-, or person-like. 
In this article, I will discuss the empirical evidence col-
lected thus far by CSR researchers and the various ways by 
which these researchers suggest that the folk anthropomor-
phically (or not) represent supernatural agents. Additionally, 
I will attempt to clear up confusions about anthropomor-
phism that I think are harming CSR’s efforts to explain super-
natural representations, e ecially regarding the embodiment 
of supernatural agents. I will demonstrate that anthropomor-
phism, in all of its variations (including those not presently 
considered in CSR), gives us a much clearer picture of how 
the folk represents supernatural agents. 
There are numerous ways uncovered and discussed in 
CSR by which the folk anthropomorphize things—real and 
imagined—in their environment. The ways that I discuss 
here are not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, I have chosen 
the ways which are most commonly discussed in CSR and 
those which are deeply problematic, such as CSR’s ham-fist-
ed rejection of embodiment for supernatural agents. These 
ways are anthropomorphism qua human-like: agency, minds, 
limitations, sociability, and bodies. I will address each of these 
ways of anthropomorphizing in order, pointing out the ev-
idence for them, the potential or actual problems they face, 
and areas for potential research.
Anthropomorphism qua 
human-like minds
An obvious and fundamental question that arises in dis-
cussions of anthropomorphism in the context of religions is 
how to distinguish it from attributing agency to a thing — 
that is, animism (Epley et al., 2007; Shaman et al., 2018; Way-
tz et al., 2010a). Whatever the empirical difference between 
the two might be, it will surely not be a difference in kind. 
Humans are agents among the vast world of agents. This is 
only to say two things: (1) that not all agency attributions 
are anthropomorphism; and (2) that looking for any wholly 
unique anthropomorphic chara eristics—that is, a trait that 
humans do not share to any degree with any other animals—
is likely a fool’s errand. Nevertheless, in the mythologies of 
religions, humans are set apart from animals. Thus, from the 
folk’s per ective, it is a difference in kind. Now that that is 
said, let’s forget that I said it and discuss attributions that are 
often considered uniquely human.
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By attributing a human-like mind, anthropomorphism 
requires ascribing a human-like psychology to the thing being 
anthropomorphized. There are several different a ects of 
human psychology which could be anthropomorphized onto 
supernatural agents: perceptual agency, intentional agency, 
emotional states, higher-order intentionality, moral agency, 
and aesthetic agency.2 All of these, save aesthetic agency, have 
been demonstrated through experimental studies in CSR to 
be attributed to supernatural agents by the folk. I will discuss 
each of these in order.
Humans, like most animals, are not simply passive per-
ceivers, we are perceptual agents—meaning, our perceptions 
of the world are not neutral; perceiving is “perceiving as.” 
It is the difference between seeing another animal and see-
ing a potential predator, food, mate, or rival. It is the differ-
ence between hearing sounds and hearing a predator, a baby’s 
cry, language, or music. It is the difference between seeing an 
L-shaped object and seeing a potential place to sit. This per-
ceptual agency is a fundamental a ect of the human mind 
(Gibson, 2015 [1979]; Guthrie, 1980, 1993; Hodge, 2006; 
Shepard, 1984). 
Experimental studies conducted in CSR examining 
how the folk anthropomorphizes supernatural agents by 
representing them with human-like perceptual abilities have 
proven to be a mixed bag. Whereas participants are record-
ed regularly attributing visual and auditory perception to 
supernatural agents, olfactory, ta ile, and gustatory sens-
es are far less frequently attributed to them (Bek and Lock, 
2011; Bering, 2002; Bering et al., 2005; Nyhof and Johnson, 
2017; Shtulman, 2008; Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016; Wat-
son-Jones et al., 2017) save when the participants are imag-
ining themselves as surviving their own deaths in an afterlife 
(Pereira et al., 2012). This may, however, be an artifact of how 
the perceptual questions are asked (Hodge, 2012; Lane et al., 
2016). I will return to this possibility when I discuss anthro-
pomorphism qua human-like bodies in a later section.
Humans are not simply perceptual agents; they are inten-
tional agents—i.e., they act within their experiential awareness3 
in accordance with belief-desire psychology (Wellman, 2014). 
This means, in the least, that anything that is anthropomor-
phized will most often be attributed intentional agency. This 
does not mean, however, that the thing ascribed intentional 
agency actually has it. Instead, the ascription of intentional 
agency to a thing provides the folk a shortcut by which to rea-
son about that thing’s behavior (Dennett, 1989).4
As Boyer (2001) suggests, intentional agency is likely 
the foundation by which to understand supernatural agent 
representations. This is because by attributing intentional 
agency, the folk can avail themselves of a rich array of po-
tential inferences about that being thanks to our theory of 
mind (ToM). ToM is an anthropomorphizing, analogical, 
cognitive process which allows us to read the minds of oth-
ers by attributing to our subject causal, intentional, con-
tent-bearing, representational mental states (Griffin and 
Baron-Cohen, 2002).5 Regarding the folk’s ascription of in-
tentional mental states to supernatural agents, Boyer (2001, 
p. 144, emphasis original) writes:
First, note that gods and spirits are not rep-
resented as having human features in gener-
al, but as having minds, which is much more 
specific. People represent supernatural 
agents who perceive events, have thoughts 
and memories and intentions. But they do 
not always project other human character-
istics, like having a body, eating food, liv-
ing with a family or gradually getting older. 
Indeed, anthropologists know that the only 
feature of humans that is always projected 
onto supernatural beings is the mind.
Some might be tempted to think, as many in CSR have 
been prone to do, that ascribing intentional agency, in the 
least, is a requirement for anthropomorphism, e ecially with 
regard to supernatural agents. Certainly, one would be hard-
pressed to think of a supernatural agent which does not have 
a mind in the sense of having intentional agency. Immediately 
following that quote, however, Boyer (2001, p. 144) is quick 
to point out that not all minds are human minds and that 
intentional agency alone will not get you to a human mind. 
He also suggests there, and rightly so, that not all supernatural 
agents have a human-like mind, even though they may be at-
tributed intentional agency. 
Moreover, it is not always the potential attribution of a 
mind to an entity, supernatural or otherwise, that anthropo-
morphizes that entity. Consider the teddy bear again. Even 
though it has human infant-like facial chara eristics, one 
does not, ceteris paribus, attribute intentional agency to the 
teddy bear as well. This does not mean that one cannot ap-
ply ToM to the teddy bear if they so choose; rather, it simply 
means that ToM inferences are not the target domain of the 
anthropomorphizing analogy in such cases. Likewise, when 
it comes to supernatural agents, ascribing to them an inten-
tional, belief-desire psychology is not always the point. For in-
stance, even though Ammet, the Egyptian crocodile-headed 
2 I have not included subjectivity in this list of uniquely human psychological characteristics because, as I see it, self-awareness is required 
for higher-order intentionality, moral agency, and aesthetic agency.
3 Experiential awareness is the cognizance of both one’s internal states (e.g., hunger) and external stimuli from one’s environment (i.e., 
perceptions). Experiential awareness is strongly linked to embodiment.
4 This ability requires higher-order intentionality, which I discuss below.
5 The goal of ToM, however, is not merely to mindread. The goal is to understand and to predict the behavior of the thing (as a whole 
entity) toward which we are applying our ToM.
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god with the body of a lion and hippopotamus combined, who 
devoured the souls of those Egyptians Anubis found unwor-
thy, had intentional agency, it was not her intentional agency 
that made her religiously relevant. Likewise, the supernatural 
agents The Bull of Heaven from The Epic of Gilgamesh, the 
Minotaur, Cerberus, and Pegasus from Greek mythology, 
dragons and the leviathan from The Bible, and the winged-
horse Buraq who carried Mohammed into the heavens are 
not relevant to their religious narratives because of what the 
folk might glean by applying ToM to them. As I will discuss 
in later section, however, this does not mean that those super-
natural beasts are not anthropomorphized. Yet even though 
intentional agency may not be foremost anthropomorphizing 
attribute of the supernatural agent,, numerous experimental 
studies in CSR that have shown that the folk, beginning in 
childhood, both implicitly and explicitly attribute intention-
al agency to supernatural agents: this includes the afterliv-
ing deceased (Astuti and Harris, 2008; Bek and Lock, 2011; 
Bering, 2002; Bering et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2011; Harris and 
Giménez, 2005; Huang et al., 2013; Pereira et al., 2012; Wat-
son-Jones et al., 2017) and the gods and other supernatural 
beings  (Haslam et al., 2008; Heiphetz et al., 2016; Lane et al., 
2010; Ma-Kellams, 2015; Moriguchi et al., 2018; Shaman et 
al., 2018; Shtulman, 2008; Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016). 
But again, attributing intentional agency on its own is not 
 ecifically anthropomorphizing the entity.
Another staple of human psychology is our emotions 
(Damasio, 1994, 1999). Like intentional agency, emotional 
states are frequently anthropomorphized onto things—real 
or imaginary—in our environment to aid in our under-
standing and predicting of those things’ perceived behavior. 
These range from base emotions such as attachment, excite-
ment, anger, disgust to more subtle emotional states such as 
love, happiness, sadness, contentment, and boredom. Emo-
tional states are routinely and robustly anthropomorphized 
to supernatural agents by the folk as several studies in CSR 
have shown (Bering, 2002; Bering and Bjorklund, 2004; 
Emmons and Kelemen, 2014; Haslam et al., 2008; Shtulman 
and Lindeman, 2016).
Attributing a human-like mind to a supernatural agent 
requires the folk to attribute more than emotions and in-
tentional agency (Gervais, 2013). We share those mental 
attributes with, or at least project it onto, a host of other 
events, objects, and entities—either real or imagined—in 
our environment. There are several mental chara eristics by 
which one can say that the human mind is unique. The first 
is higher-order intentionality, or the ability to represent the 
thoughts of others via our ToM. 
Humans are higher-order intentional agents. We are not 
only capable of recognizing our own intentional states but, ad-
ditionally, “reading” the intentional states of others in relation 
to our own. At the very least, ToM assumes that the mind the 
folk are reading operates by a similar belief-desire psycholo-
gy by which their own do. Many supernatural agents, across 
religious cultures, are attributed higher-order intentionality 
by the folk. This means that these supernatural agents too 
can use ToM to read minds—the folk’s minds. But, not only 
can they read the folk’s mind, many such supernatural agents 
are also believed to have privileged epistemic access to the 
folk’s minds and to their most secreted contents (Bering and 
Johnson, 2005). Because of this, supernatural agents are said 
to have socially strategic information (Boyer, 2001; Purzyc-
ki, 2013; Purzycki et al., 2012). This a potentially harrowing 
proposition given the next uniquely human mental feature 
commonly anthropomorphized onto supernatural agents.
In addition to being higher-order intentional agents, hu-
mans are moral agents. The folk guides their a ions by eth-
ical principles of right and wrong. Moreover, the folk judges 
the a ions of other moral agents as right or wrong (Greene, 
2003; Knobe, 2010).  These are mental exercises that the folk 
generally do not ascribe other animals, aside from perhaps, 
certain pets (de Waal, 2009; Deane-Drummond, 2009; Mc-
Ginn, 1995; Sapontzis, 1980). It is difficult how, for example, 
we would call a bear a moral agent. We would not hold a bear 
morally responsible for its behavior, even if it were to kill a 
basket full of kittens. The folk usually reserves the ‘moral 
agent’ ascription for things like themselves. Thus, to the ex-
tent to which the folk might ascribe moral agency to a su-
pernatural agent, they can be said to anthropomorphize that 
supernatural agent. 
Across many religions, moral supernatural agents have 
privileged epistemic access to the folk’s mental content. This 
means that these supernatural agents not only know the folk’s 
most secreted thoughts and desires, they have also borne wit-
ness to their behaviors. Moralizing supernatural agents use 
this socially strategic information to morally judge the folk’s 
lives. Yet, not only do these supernatural agents morally judge 
the folk, they also di ense rewards and punishments to the 
folk according to those judgments. Although it is difficult 
nowadays to imagine religion without such moralizing super-
natural agents such as the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God, this 
appears to have been a recent (in evolutionary terms) devel-
opment in human culture: only since the rise of axial religions. 
Their arrival in the folk’s imagination created monumental 
cultural changes and upheavals. Moralizing supernatural 
agents facilitated the move from small hunter-gatherer famil-
ial groups to large-scale human societies which they policed 
as overseer, protector, and punisher. The belief in moralizing 
supernatural agents promoted universal cooperation across 
diverse human populations, overcoming geographical and 
linguistic barriers. Anthropomorphically projecting morality 
onto supernatural agents changed the very nature of human 
culture and social organization (Baumard and Boyer, 2013; 
Johnson, 2016; Norenzayan, 2013, 2016; Roes and Raymond, 
2003; Rossano, 2007, 2010). 
In addition to being perceptual, emotive, higher-order 
intentional, moral agents, humans are also higher-order aes-
thetic agents. Many things in nature are capable of creating 
something beautiful, but most of those creators (if not all, 
save humans) are incapable of appreciating beauty. Moreover, 
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among the animal kingdom, humans are the only ones that 
create something beautiful merely for the sake of that beau-
ty (i.e., art). To the extent to which we might attribute high-
er-order aesthetic agency to a supernatural agent, we can be 
said to be anthropomorphizing that agent. To date,6 there are 
no studies in CSR which explore the extent to which the folk 
attribute supernatural entities with aesthetic agency either 
in the role of appreciating or creating beauty for itself, even 
though numerous examples of ascribing aesthetic agency to 
supernatural agents, both as creator and as appreciative of 
beauty, are found in religious mythologies across the globe.
Anthropomorphism qua 
human-like limitations
Some scholars in CSR have argued that the folk an-
thropomorphizes a supernatural agent when they place hu-
man-like limitations upon it. The idea behind this is that re-
ligious theologies dehumanize some gods. This is achieved in 
two ways: first, gods are stripped of human-like traits such 
embodiment and gender; and second, they are ascribed a 
number of unhuman-like abilities such as immortality, om-
niscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniperception.7 
These are deemed the theologically correct representations 
of certain supernatural agents such as the Judeo-Christian-Is-
lamic God and the Hindu god Brahman. When the folk 
reapplies these human-like limitations, such as applying hu-
man-like limited perceptual abilities to these gods, they are 
anthropomorphizing them. Anthropomorphized represen-
tations of these deities are said to be theologically incorrect 
representations (Slone, 2007). 
This idea of folk anthropomorphism was pioneered by 
Barrett and colleagues (Barrett, 1998; Barrett and Keil, 1996; 
Barrett and VanOrman, 1996) in a series of experimental 
studies. In their most influential studies (Barrett and Keil, 
1996; Barrett, 1998) conducted with American Christians 
and Indian Hindus, participants were presented a narrative 
about a divine being (God or Brahman, re ectively) answer-
ing a prayer which was neutral with regard to time and space 
and perceptual abilities in relation to that deity (although 
see criticisms of the experimental paradigm and interpreta-
tion by Nikkel, 2015; Shtulman, 2008; and Westh, 2013). In 
a later part of the study, the participants were asked by the 
researchers to recount the narrative they had heard. Again, 
although the initial narrative was neutral regarding time, 
space, and perceptual abilities for the deity, when the partic-
ipants recalled and retold the narrative, the deity was sub-
ject to the same restrictions of time and space—occupying a 
single location in space and attending to events sequentially 
through time—as well as having limited perceptual abilities 
similar to us humans. Thus, Barrett and colleagues claimed, 
when the folk likewise attribute these human-like limitations 
to these supernatural agents, they are providing an anthropo-
morphized, theologically incorrect representation. This view 
of anthropomorphism toward supernatural agent concepts 
has been widely influential in CSR as it has surreptitiously 
appeared and been adopted in much subsequent research 
(Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Richert, 2003; Barrett et al., 2001; 
Heiphetz et al., 2016; Heiphetz et al., 2018; Knight et al., 2004; 
Lane et al., 2010; Shtulman, 2008; Shtulman and Lindeman, 
2016; Slone, 2007). This is largely because CSR researchers 
have retained a near laser focus on the Judeo-Christian-Is-
lamic God to the neglect of all others. This is potentially prob-
lematic for CSR’s contributions in understanding supernatu-
ral agent representations inasmuch as just a few supernatural 
beings amongst a host of thousands across world religions are 
ascribed such limitless powers. 
Another group of CSR scholars argues that God con-
cepts themselves are not, contrary to received wisdom (Piag-
et, 1929), based on anthropomorphism but rather on a gen-
eral intentional agent conceptual template which does not 
assume any human-like limitations on the agent given that, in 
our evolutionary environment, agents come with a variety of 
nonhuman-like abilities (Barrett and Richert, 2003; Barrett 
et al., 2001; Knight et al., 2004; Richert et al., 2016a; Richert 
et al., 2016b; Richert and Smith, 2010; Shtulman and Linde-
man, 2016). God is nonhuman-like inasmuch as it is not re-
stricted by a body, time, or space. Moreover, God is immortal, 
all-knowing, and is not limited in its perceptual capabilities. 
Thus, “concepts of God are easily accommodated [by the gen-
eral intentional agent template] because they play upon these 
default assumptions rather than violate them” (Barrett and 
Richert, 2003, p. 301). Thus, when the folk places human-like 
limitations on God, they are anthropomorphizing it because 
they are applying a  ecifically human-like limitation from a 
human-like agent template rather than from a general inten-
tional agent template. This idea, however, has not gone un-
challenged (Hodge and Sousa, in press; Lane et al., 2010; Lane 
et al., 2012).
Anthropomorphism qua 
human-like sociability
Stewart Guthrie (1980, 1993), one of the pioneers of 
CSR, went as far as to claim that religion is anthropomorphism. 
Guthrie’s anthropomorphism theory of religious supernatural 
6 Of which I am aware at the time of writing this (Sept. 2018). Shaman et al. (2018) came close to broaching this topic when they queried 
participants about God’s ability to engage in pretense with an imaginary friend, but the question was too narrowly focused to shed light 
on God’s potential for aesthetic agency.
7 In other words, these supreme high-gods are not and should not be conceived through or by applications of folk physics, folk biology, 
or folk psychology (Shaman et al., 2018).
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agent representations leaves the door wide open regarding 
what physical, biological, psychological, and social human-like 
attributes the folk might attribute to religious entities. Never-
theless, he does stress that human-like symbolic and social in-
tera ions such as language use, reciprocity, and social roles, and 
relationships are the most common and important properties 
anthropomorphically projected upon supernatural agents. The 
religious folk shares with their gods a common language, com-
mon rituals, and a common social structure. 
Anthropomorphizing supernatural agents with hu-
man-like psychology allows the folk to view them as potential 
social inter-actors (Boyer, 2001; Green, 2015).8 Social inter-
a ion, whether natural or supernatural, requires intention-
al, mental, and physical intera ion (Hodge, 2011a, 2011b, 
2016). This puts supernatural agents in line with Boyer’s 
(2001, p. 138, emphasis original) description of supernatural 
agents as social inter-actors and why and how the folk (at-
tempt to) interact with them:
Also, what is a constant object of intuitions 
and reasoning are situations of interaction 
with these agents. People do not just stipu-
late that there is a supernatural being some-
where who creates thunder or that there 
are souls wandering about in the night. 
People actually interact with these beings 
in the very concrete sense of doing things 
to them, experiencing them doing things, 
giving and receiving, paying, threatening, 
protecting, placating and so on.
Epley et al. (2007) too argue that anthropomorphism 
is, in part, motivated by our desire to socially interact with 
the world. Additionally, studies conducted by Richert et al. 
(2016b) show that children and parents who are taught that 
prayer serves a symbolic and social intera ion with God—
as opposed to simply making the person think about God—
were significantly more likely to anthropomorphize God.9
It is not necessary, however, that the thing being an-
thropomorphized be attributed human-like psychological 
chara eristics to be in social relationships with humans (Orr, 
2015). This is witnessed in both the natural and supernatural 
realms of the folk: crocodiles, as a threat to live ock and life 
and limb, are a threat to one’s wealth and status; dogs provide 
labor, protection, and companionship; dragons are mytholog-
ically depicted across many religions, including Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism, as existential threats to society it-
self, or as protectors of things with great social significance; 
Ammit devoured dishonest Egyptian souls; Pegasus be owed 
status upon Poseidon (as the patron god of horses) and Bel-
lerophon (as Pegasus’s rider into battle), as did the winged-
horse Buraq who carried Mohammed to the heavens; Hum-
baba protected the Cedar Forest where the Mesopotamian 
gods lived; Cerberus guarded the entrance to Hades so that 
the living could not enter and the dead could not leave; and 
so forth.10 The point is that it is not always a mind that makes 
a supernatural agent socially relevant, nor is it reading that 
agent’s mind (via ToM) that makes it socially interesting.11
Anthropomorphism qua 
human-like bodies
Irre ective of which religion one examines, religions are 
replete with hosts of supernatural agents represented with 
human-like bodies. There are the jinn, angels, and demons in 
Islam, winged-angels in Christianity, and the Kami in Shin-
toism. In Hinduism, hundreds, if not thousands, of gods are 
represented with human-like forms: Krishna, Ganesh (albeit 
with an elephant head), Shiva, just to name a few. Likewise, 
there are the buddhas, the bodhisattvas, and the wrathful dei-
ties in Buddhism who too have human-like bodies. In ancient 
religions, the Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Gael-
ic, and Norse pantheons are all populated by gods with de-
scriptively distinct, gendered, human-like bodies. Even a brief 
consultation with dictionaries and encyclopedias (Coulter 
and Turner, 2012; Ellwood and Alles, 2007; Jones, 2005; Jor-
dan, 2004; Levinson, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Lurker, 2004; Tay-
lor, 2000) describing religious beliefs and representations of 
supernatural agents as well as the Electronic Human Relations 
Area Files12 will confirm that, cross-culturally, the dominant 
representation of supernatural agents is with a human-like 
body. Additionally, the afterliving deceased too are represent-
ed across world religions, past and present, as retaining their 
human-like physique (Hodge, 2008).
It is this religious fact, however, that most imperils the rel-
evancy of CSR’s research into supernatural agents and anthropo-
morphism. This is because the one chara eristic upon which 
CSR researchers agree is that the folk represent supernatural 
agents as wholly disembodied beings despite the va , over-
whelming, and deva ating evidence against this folk representa-
tion (for examples of this widespread agreement in CSR, see 
Bering, 2010; Boyer, 2001; Cohen et al., 2011; Gervais, 2013; 
8 Not “interactors” in the Darwinian sense.
9 In this study, at least with regard to psychological attributions, anthropomorphism amounted to placing human-like limitations on God.
10 This is without explicitly addressing a widespread phenomenon often absent from CSR accounts, totemism. Totemism provides social 
significance and the possibility of social interaction with a diverse variety of natural objects and non-human agents in the world.
11 Supernatural agents such as these are counter-indicative of Boyer’s proposal (from p. 3) that the folk always project minds onto super-
natural agents. Moreover, while it might be the case that these natural and supernatural creatures have minds, they are not human-like 
minds. What makes them interesting and human-like (anthropomorphized) is the social roles that they fulfill.
12 eHRAF World Cultures Database.Human Relations Area Files. Available at: http://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu
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Gray et al., 2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Purzycki and Willard, 
2016; Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016). This is because CSR 
researchers are firmly convinced that the folk are intuitive 
mind-body dualists, seeing the mind as the immaterial carrier 
and conveyor of our mental lives and personal identity, and 
wholly separate and independent from our physical bodies. 
In another recent work, a colleague and I (Hodge and Sou-
sa, 2018) expose what we see as deep flaws in the dualistic, 
disembodied interpretation of supernatural agent represen-
tations. This paradigm claims that supernatural agents, across 
the array of religions, are represented by the folk as wholly 
immaterial, disembodied mental entities. We argue that 
there were numerous reasons why this interpretation was 
flawed: confusing the supernatural agents’ lack of a physical 
body with the lack of an imagined one; confusing the concept 
INVISIBLE with DISEMBODIED; overinterpreting ToM; 
and failing to recognize the folk’s ontological and functional 
distinctions between the mind and the soul. The most devas-
tating problem as we see it, however, is the fact that this du-
alistic, disembodied interpretation of folk supernatural agent 
representations impressively fails to account for supernatural 
agent representations as they are found in religions across the 
world. In other words, the wholly immaterial, mental super-
natural agents supposedly discovered in the CSR research-
er’s laboratory look nothing like the panoply of human-like 
embodied supernatural agents recorded across the time and 
space of human religious cultures by archaeologists, anthro-
pologists, and religious scholars.13
There are three additional reasons I wish to discuss here 
as to why I believe that CSR has taken this treacherous wrong 
turn in explaining supernatural agent representations: an 
over-attribution of folk dualism, an artefact of the questions 
being asked participants in studies probing potential embod-
iment of supernatural agents, and mistakenly thinking that 
representing a supernatural agent with a human-like body re-
quires representing all of a human body’s features. I will take 
each of these in order. 
CSR researchers have an undue overcommitment to 
intuitive folk mind-body dualism to the extent where some 
have declared it settled science (Purzycki and Willard, 2016; 
White et al., 2017).14 Intuitive folk mind-body dualism is the 
theoretical proposal that the folk, by intuitive default, views 
themselves as minds who inhabit bodies (Bloom, 2004). 
Their bodies are wholly accidental to their nature and per-
sonal identity, and the folk believe they are wholly capable of 
continuing to exist beyond the death of their body as disem-
bodied minds. This claim is the theoretical interpretation of 
numerous studies by CSR researchers in which participants 
show a significant bias for attributing epistemic, emotional, 
and desirous psychological properties to the afterliving de-
ceased over biological, psychobiological, and perceptual prop-
erties (Astuti and Harris, 2008; Bek and Lock, 2011; Bering, 
2002; Bering et al., 2005; Gomes et al., 2016; Gray et al., 2011; 
Huang et al., 2013; Lane et al., 2016; Sebe ény and Emmons, 
2017; Watson-Jones et al., 2017). Likewise, this bias is demon-
strated in experimental studies of the folk’s representation of 
gods and interpreted by researchers as evidence of intuitive 
folk mind-body dualism, even though the wholly immaterial, 
independent minds attributed to the supernatural agents in 
these studies are not  ecifically human-like (Haslam et al., 
2008; Nyhof and Johnson, 2017; Shaman et al., 2018; Shtul-
man, 2008; Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016).
Several CSR scholars, however, have argued that the in-
tuitive folk mind-body dualism theory is not directly demon-
strated, highly interpretative, prematurely accepted, or just 
down-right wrong (Chandler and Dunlop, 2015; Hodge, 
2008; Hodge and Sousa, 2018; Horst, 2016; Lindeman et al., 
2002; Nikkel, 2015, 2018; Rottman and Kelemen, 2011). One 
of the reasons I propose underlies these experimental find-
ings is that the folk, ceteris paribus, are far more intere ed 
in the mental lives of others than they are in the mundane 
bodily states and functions of others. It is contemplating the 
thoughts, beliefs, and desires of others that provides the folk a 
better way to gauge and predict those others’ behaviors than 
ruminating over the others’ caloric intakes and digestive sys-
tems (Hodge, 2012, 2016, 2018). Moreover, it is the former 
states, rather than the latter, that determine the fates of our 
social intera ions with those others. Thus, it is little surprise 
that the folk also demonstrate this strong bias in their super-
natural agent representations. 
The second reason that underlies these experimen-
tal findings is methodological. It is the result of the types 
of questions asked by CSR experimenters. The participants 
are asked whether they represent the biological states and 
processes of supernatural agents such as hunger, digesting, 
growing, having a heart, sleeping, getting ill, and the like. 
Given that these supernatural agent representations are 
imaginative, and that we rarely, ceteris paribus, imaginatively 
represent our living con ecifics with those biological fea-
tures, it is little wonder that they do not appear in super-
natural agent representations.  It is all too easy to forget that 
the representation of supernatural agents is an imaginative 
endeavor. This leads me to my next point.
Attributing human-like physical features to an anthro-
pomorphized thing does not mean that all human-like phys-
iology must be attributed to the thing. This is where some 
CSR empirical studies into the anthropomorphism of super-
natural agents run awry. The researchers implicitly assume 
13 We do not dispute the evidence gathered in these experimental studies, but rather the theoretical and methodological assumptions 
by which that evidence is interpreted by CSR researchers. For additional criticisms of this interpretation as it is specifically applied to the 
afterliving deceased, see Hodge (2008, 2011b, 2012, 2018).
14 Boyer’s (2001) claim that supernatural agents are always attributed minds has been strongly influential in this misplaced confidence 
as well.
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that if one is physically anthropomorphizing a supernatural 
agent, then one must attribute all human-like physiological 
features to that thing at all times and at once (for examples 
of researchers proposing such [mis?]readings of both Guth-
rie’s (1980, 1993) anthropomorphism theory of supernat-
ural agents, see De Cruz (2013) and Shaman et al. (2018) 
and likewise Boyer’s (2001) PERSON template as applied 
to supernatural agents, see Shtulman (2008) and Shtulman 
and Lindeman (2016)). It would be cognitively overwhelm-
ing—not to mention violating all the principles of cognitive 
economy (Boden, 2006; d’Andrade, 1995; Hodge, 2006; 
Lambert and Chasteen, 1999; Medin and Ortony, 1989; 
Michalski, 1989)—if, when imaginatively representing a 
human-like embodied supernatural agent, we had to repre-
sent them with all the accompanying viscera, effluvia, skele-
tature, musculature, belly-button, and all.15 Moreover, there 
is no reason to think that the folk does so. We do not build 
our imaginative representations of others—whether real or 
fictional—from the individual cells on up. On the contrary, 
we only imaginatively supply them with the body parts 
necessary to recognize them as the person they are and to 
carry out whatever, usually socially-relevant, a ivity we are 
imagining them undertaking. I have called this imaginative 
representation “social embodiment” (Hodge, 2008, 2011a, 
2011b, 2016). 
With a social embodiment thesis of supernatural agents 
in mind, a different set of questions need to be asked to deter-
mine the extent to which the participants are imaginatively 
representing supernatural agents with human-like bodies. For 
instance, questions such as “Does she (in the afterlife, for ex-
ample) smile when she sees her loved ones?” and “Can he hug 
his loved ones with him in the afterlife?” and “Does she (a god-
dess, perhaps) shed a tear when she sees needless suffering?” 
These questions, I believe, would fare much better in eliciting 
from participants the nature and extent of their human-like 
bodily representations of supernatural agents.
Moreover, the social embodiment thesis has gained 
some initial empirical support. De Cruz (2013) found that 
participants given a structured imagination task were sig-
nificantly more likely to represent (alien) supernatural 
agents according to the social embodiment thesis than by 
the intuitive folk mind-body dualism driven hypothesis of 
disembodied mind supernatural agent representations or 
representing the supernatural agents with all the features 
of human bodies (guts and all). Additionally, Lane et al. 
(2016) found that participants queried about the mental 
and physical capabilities of the afterliving deceased sans any 
social context in the questions significantly decreased the 
attributions they made across the board in accord with the 
predictions of the social embodiment thesis of supernatural 
agents (Hodge, 2012).
To reiterate a point which I do not believe can be over-
stated: the very relevance of CSR in explaining supernatural agent 
representations is challenged by researchers’ undue overcommit-
ment to intuitive folk mind-body dualism and disembodied mind 
interpretations of experimental findings (Hodge and Sousa, 
2018; Nikkel, 2015, 2018). CSR’s rejection of folk human-like 
body representations of supernatural agents flies in the face 
of vast and overwhelming evidence gathered from multiple 
disciplines and cross-culturally evidenced in religions across 
the time and space of human existence. Even though arguably 
it is the case that all supernatural agents are attributed a mind 
(à la Boyer, 2001), it is not always a human-like mind, and 
it is not always their mind that makes them religiously and 
socially interesting. On the contrary, it is often their bodies.
Conclusion
CSR has demonstrated great potential in exposing, 
explaining, and understanding folk supernatural agent rep-
resentations. Specifically, CSR has empirically exposed the 
numerous ways by which the folk anthropomorphically rep-
resent, or not, supernatural agents. The folk can assign to 
those supernatural agents a human-like mind, social roles, 
relationships, as well as our mental and physical limitations. 
By anthropomorphizing the supernatural world, we have 
made this world more familiar and less frightening. More-
over, by anthropomorphizing supernatural agents as moral 
agents with social policing roles, we have changed the tra-
jectories of our cultures and societies. Anthropomorphizing 
the supernatural world has created monumental changes in 
our own.
CSR still faces considerable challenges in empirically 
investigating supernatural agent representations, however. 
Researchers still need to e ablish, both methodological-
ly and theoretically, a clearer way by which to demarcate 
when the folk are anthropomorphizing an entity versus sim-
ply attributing intentional agency to it. I have sugge ed a 
few uniquely human chara eristics by which this might be 
empirically explored, such as examining whether and under 
what conditions the folk represent supernatural agents with 
moral, aesthetic, and social agency. All of these are strong 
candidates given their preexisting representations in world 
religions. Moreover, I have emphatically called-out CSR 
for its ham-fisted rejection of embodiment for supernatu-
ral agents—whether human-like or not. I have argued that 
this situation, due to an overcommitment to pet theories, 
has placed CSR’s theory of supernatural agent representa-
tions as disembodied minds in direct conflict with the over-
whelming and devastating preexisting evidence of how the 
folk imaginatively, emphatically, and descriptively represent 
the socially embodied diversity of supernatural agents.
15 On obvious example of a supernatural agent being represented with internal viscera, however, is Prometheus, whom Zeus chained to 
a boulder and sent his eagle daily to eat Prometheus’s liver as punishment for gifting fire to humans. Nevertheless, in line with the social 
embodiment thesis of supernatural agents I will be offering, this mythological representation is socially relevant.
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